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THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

PN, D.C. 20301

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14 April 1967

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Proposed Redeployment of US Forces from
Germany (U)

STATE, JCS, OSD reviews completed

1. (S) At 1030 hours, 14 April 1967, the Director, Joint Staff, met at Bonn, Germany, with representatives of the FRG MOD Staff to discuss subject matter. From the US standpoint, the purpose of the discussion was two-fold: first, to provide as definitive answers as possible with respect to the rotation plan; second, to reassure the Germans that the plan had no hidden or contingent aspects.

PRESENT

US

Lt General B. E. Spivy
Maj General Hewitt,
CH, MAAG, FRG (For
initial portion)
Colonel J. W. Guest, J-5
Colonel W. H. Hawes, J-5

FRG

Maj General Buchs, MOD (Dep
Insp Gen, Armed Forces)
Colonel Krauss, MOD
(Director for Plans)
Colonel Zimmerman, MOD (Plans)
Colonel Junghanss, MOD (Plans)
Dr. Behrends, Foreign Office
Herr Theissinger, Office of
the Chancellor

2. (S) General Buchs opened the discussion by saying that NATO, militarily speaking at least, was at a crossroads. He referred to the Lisbon goals, i.e., 90-divisions, which were agreed in 1952 but never met and MC 26/4 goals which, although lower, were never achieved. NATO has not had force goals for a year and a half, and now actions were underway that would reduce NATO military strength in Central Europe from its present levels. Accordingly, the military advice that the MOD must provide to the FRG government was of extreme importance; hence, he wanted to state from the outset that their questions must of necessity be penetrating, but they would be motivated not by lack of trust but rather because of a need for full understanding of the import of the proposed plan in order to make thorough evaluation, recommendation and explanation to the Defense Committee on 18 April.

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This Committee is chaired by the Chancellor and includes Shroeder, Brandt and others. Colonel Junghanss stated that the redeployment time factor was the essence of the problem posed for the FRG by the plan. The FRG position on warning time was as stated in WG I reports, i.e., 6 days. The FRG believed there was a requirement for a certain level of conventional forces to meet a limited attack in the Central Region and to provide ample options for a flexible response. With the US proposal, they believe that NATO has reached a critical point. The discussion then turned to a series of specific questions as follows:

a. Question. Can you give us details on the Division Headquarters? How much will be left in the FRG? What will be the location of the Division Commander? (General Buchs explained he felt the Division Commander should be present in the FRG because of planning and operational requirements and especially for psychological reasons, i.e., the Division Commander's presence is a politically sensitive matter.)

Response. A portion of the Division Headquarters would be in the FRG at all times; at times, more could be present than at others. The Division Commander or an Assistant Division Commander would be in the FRG at all times. With 2/3 of the Division in the United States, the Division Commander would be there much of the time; can't be too specific, but he will be where he is most needed at any particular time. It is normal for the US division to have an advance and rear command echelons when in the field, and the concept provides for a portion of the headquarters to be present at all times.

b. Question. The figures of 35,000, 28,000, and 6,500 - can you give us any more details?

Response. The total will not exceed 35,000. These figures are flexible; however, the Air Force is likely to approximate 6,000 to 6,100 although it could reach 6,500 - this will depend upon decisions with regard to the types of operating bases, i.e., MOB/OOB/DOB. The 28,000 Army figure also is a flexible one. The 24th divisional elements to be redeployed would be from 10,000 - 11,000. Others may come from COMZ, 7th Army Support and other USAREUR forces which do not have a NATO mission. This is being worked out in detail with USCINCEUR and CINCUSAREUR.

c. Question. What about the combat support units? Some of these the FRG regards as critical such as HAWK, 175 mm gun battalions, SERGEANT and PERSHING units. Some of the US artillery units are in support of the German

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Corps. Are these affected? (The question of artillery support, ground nuclear delivery units, and nuclear delivery storage sites was raised several times indicating the concern the Germans have for how the United States intends to raise the other 17,000 - 18,000 and whether, as they put it, the proposal could be interpreted as the first step in "denuking", the FRG.) General Buchs discussed the "visibility" of nuclear delivery units both to the FRG military and the German public and he expressed special concern over the possibility of return to the US of nuclear weapons with redeployed units.

Response. We are unable to provide you specifics now with respect to what artillery units are affected and whether they have an FRG support role. CINCEUR is working this out now. General Spivy did agree to furnish information as soon as possible and inform CINCEUR of the FRG concern. Colonel Krauss and Captain Zimmerman were told later that irrespective of the specific units designated, the assignment of unit missions would undoubtedly be reviewed by CINCEUR, CINCENT, and CENTAG and some might be affected by changed requirements of these commanders. Therefore, they could not regard our reply as being a binding commitment. The 18,000 are not a rotational element as is the division. The units comprising it will have prepositioned equipment and will be capable of return when directed in the same manner as divisional units. There is no intent in the rotation plan to deplete or remove nuclear storage sites. (General Buchs was informed that we did not expect missile units such as PERSHING and SERGEANT to be affected by the plan and that there is no intent to weaken this nuclear capability now present in the FRG.)

d. Question. What is the NATO status of the units being withdrawn? (Here considerable discussion ensued on "assigned", "earmarked for assignment", etc.)

Response. There is no change in status for divisional and non-divisional units - only their location is changed. (The Germans finally understood this point in the context that command and control over the forces would pass to SACEUR in the same manner it does at present).

e. Question. Who makes the decision as to the time of redeployment? Can this be accomplished through SACEUR alert arrangements? How would this work in time of tension? How does this affect movement of the Strategic Reserve?

Response. This depends upon the situation existing at the time. We would expect to bring redeployed forces back first - before the M+30 forces. General Spivy explained that M-Day did not necessarily refer to full mobilization, but rather the day of decision to deploy.

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Return would not be automatic, but would depend on decisions to be taken by NATO. The redeployment of the 35,000 force could be accomplished without degradation of the anticipated arrival times of the Strategic Reserve forces.

f. Question. Recognizing that return of redeployed forces could not be keyed to a specific contingency, would it be possible to agree that the redeployment would be initiated no later than the first stage of SACEUR's alert, i.e., Military Vigilance.

Response. This is a political question. The units would be ready.

NOTE: Mr. Behrends agreed with General Buchs that the FRG foreign office would raise this point in next week's discussion with the Defense Committee. The FRG will argue for keeping return of redeployed forces to military vigilance or simple alert. Since SACEUR can call the former, they opt for this in order not to complicate the return of two brigades with NATO political considerations and decision.

g. Question. With regard to the length of time required to redeploy, i.e., 30 days, can you provide details? (The Germans indicated that they understood the three basic elements involved; i.e., readiness, movement time, and equipment marry up, but had no grasp of their time relationships. Referring to SVN airlift requirements, General Buchs stated he felt that movement capabilities could be a bar or impediment to carrying out the plan, i.e., that the US could be prevented from redeploying forces for rotational and exercise purposes. He further recalled the Berlin situation and the fact that military vigilance was not declared then nor in the Cuban crisis although military actions could have been initiated in much less than 30 days).

Response. We have accomplished several strategic deployment studies; the air movement phase is the easiest problem of all. We are studying ways to improve the redeployment times. Our DOD regards "within 30 days" as a figure it can commit itself to now. Times could be reduced under certain conditions, e.g., by increasing readiness, by use of controlled humidified storage (CHS) and by certain emergency actions. General Buchs was assured that even with current SVN commitments, we would have sufficient airlift to permit the normal peacetime rotation and exercises to take place, and that under certain emergency conditions the "2+10" forces could be lifted as well.

h. Question. Will there be a gap in the brigade overlap period? That is, will there always be a brigade in the FRG capable of fighting? (The Germans were alluding to

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the saving that could accrue from returning FRG based brigade forces to CONUS on the same airplanes bringing the CONUS based brigade to the FRG.)

Response. You could expect about a 3-4 week overlap period. A combat capable brigade force will always be in the FRG.

i. Question. When will redeployment start? (The Germans referred specifically to that part of paragraph four of the point paper which stated the movement would not commence before the US was ready to meet the criteria listed above.)

Response. No earlier than 1 January 1968. This depends on equipment availability. We would doubt that the entire force to be redeployed could move by July, 1968, but this cannot be determined until we have completed equipment availability planning. The rotation cycle should commence six months after the last brigade is deployed to the United States.

j. Question. How will the FRG be informed of the annual division exercise? (FRG wants advance notification for purposes of public relations as well as their own military purposes, e.g., use of training areas.)

Response. Might be tied in with a SACEUR or USAREUR exercise. Arrangements will, of course, provide for full prior coordination with the FRG at least through normal channels such as CINCEUR and CINCUSAREUR.

k. Question. Will the remaining brigade stay in its present area? Will the prepositioned equipment be retained in the same general area?

Response. Initially, the brigade will remain in its present area. Movement to the north later would depend upon availability of facilities, costs and recommendations of CINCEUR, and appropriate arrangements with the FRG. After all dependents are gone (those belonging to the first brigade to remain in the FRG should return with their sponsors), this may be easier to solve. This is a CINCEUR and USAREUR problem to work out in conjunction with SACEUR's EDP. We believe the prepositioned equipment should be located to the North when possible. For a division exercise, brigades deploying from CONUS could marry up with their equipment and join the brigade in the FRG in or near the maneuver area.

3. (S) The group reconvened after lunch to cover questions on the Air Force implications of the proposed plan.

a. Question. What will the length of the exercises be?

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Response. They can vary, possibly ten days or two weeks in the FRG, perhaps even longer if the exercise required it.

b. Question. How do you get a 6,000 cut in the Air Force when the squadrons account for only 2,000 or so?

Response. General Spivy explained how additional ground support personnel could be saved by reducing MOB's to OOB and DOB status.

c. Question. General Buchs noted that the Army and Air Force plans were not the same. The squadrons remaining were on a PCS basis. (General Spivy indicated they would remain for one year or more - not yet decided - and be replaced by another squadron.) General Buchs noted further that the size of the Air Force redeployment was quite large and weakens both the nuclear strike and conventional capability. Return of six Phantom squadrons reduces 50% of the Phantom aircraft in Central Europe and, taking into account the UK Canberra withdrawal, there will be a considerable reduction in strike and QRA capability. He would have thought that, based upon the US policy of flexible response, the F-4s would have been maintained to improve conventional air capability. He recognized that the forces could return in a few days and cited the Air National Guard deployments during the Berlin crisis as a basis for fully accepting this capability. However, the 17th Air Force was the backbone of the US commitment and is a tremendous threat to the Russian planner. The return of these forces couldn't be a significant money or BOP problem. He asked, what is the rationale? How can this be explained to the knowledgeable cabinet, press, and public?

Response. It was acknowledged that relatively small BOP saving would accrue from this action. Militarily, we would prefer, of course, not to redeploy these air units. As was discussed by the Trilateral Principals, political pressures exist in the United States as well as elsewhere. Nonetheless, the redeployed squadrons could return within a few days and take up conventional or nuclear roles as necessary. They would continue to be targetted by SACEUR. (General Buchs stated it was possible to interpret a withdrawal of this size as a step towards denuclearization and certainly a thinning out of real fire power. The calculations of the Russian planner are bound to be less difficult with 2/3 of the three wings in the United States. Presence of substantial forces are needed to deter even small scale attacks.)

d. Question. How does this proposal affect the US LIVE OAK commitments, i.e., 16 aircraft, we understand. Recalling that the UK has no fighter bombers, the French

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
are lost, and the FRG cannot participate, full reliance is on the United States.

Response. General Spivy indicated he was sure the LIVE OAK commitment would be unaffected, but he would check and verify this for General Buchs.

4. (S) General Buchs wondered what effect US redeployments might have on the Canadians. He stated they have already reduced two strike squadrons and there are indications that the Canadian Air Division may be further reduced. He also noted with concern the Belgian plans to reduce forces. General Buchs closed the discussion by reiterating his special concern over the disproportionate reduction in Air Force capability and the resultant weakening of the deterrent toward the Pact, combined with the psychological impact upon the German public.

5. (S) Dr. ^{and final} Behrends indicated the FRG would not be ready for the next Trilateral meeting until after 25 April. This would be in London. *now set for 27/28 April*

6. (S) The meeting adjourned at 1445.


B. E. SPIVY
Lt General, USA
Director, Joint Staff

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